Egypt is emerging as a pivotal actor and trusted mediator in many of the key security challenges facing the region.
Egyptian security personnel are instrumental in advancing the implementation of the Trump 20 Point Plan for resolving the Gaza conflict.
Seeking to avoid regional conflagration, Egyptian officials are trying to restart nuclear talks between Iran and the Trump team.
Egypt is attempting to contain and manage the effects of the conflicts raging on its western and southern borders by supporting strongmen in Libya and Sudan.
On the strength of its close relationship with the Trump national security team, its large army, and its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has become an indispensable actor in nearly all the key security files facing the Near East. From Libya in the west to Iran in the east, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and his top aides are major players in attempting to establish security and broker conflict resolution. As the only Arab state that borders the war-torn Gaza Strip, a mentor to mainstream Palestinian factions, and an opponent of Hamas, Cairo is the Arab mediator perhaps most trusted by both U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That trust has made Egypt pivotal to the implementation of Trump’s 20 Point Plan for resolving the conflict in Gaza.
The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack unnerved Egyptian leaders nearly as much as it did those of Israel. Sisi has been a staunch opponent of Hamas, which is ideologically aligned with the elected government of Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi that Sisi, then the top commander of the military, overthrew in 2013. Egypt has long been a mentor and supporter of Hamas’ main Palestinian rival, the secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which dominates the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA) and which in 1993 signed a U.S.-brokered peace agreement with Israel. Egyptian officials, along with their counterparts in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other Arab states, had long counseled Hamas — though unsuccessfully — to rewrite its founding charter to abandon “armed struggle” and follow the PLO in committing to a negotiated solution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Recognizing the potential for Hamas to ignite a regional conflagration, Egyptian security agencies were consistent partners of Israel in trying to prevent Iranian or other weapons and technology from flowing across Egypt’s border with the Gaza Strip.
Cairo initially feared that a major Israeli ground offensive against Hamas in Gaza — in response to the October 7 attack — would set off a flood of Gaza civilians seeking refuge, leading Egypt to largely shut the border to fleeing Palestinians. Since the assault, Egyptian officials have worked closely with their U.S. and Qatari counterparts to achieve the several ceasefires and hostage and prisoner exchanges that were agreed. The latest ceasefire, which began on October 10 under Trump’s 20 Point Plan, was brokered by the three key mediators plus Türkiye. Illustrating Egypt’s centrality to the implementation of the plan, Sisi hosted a summit meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh on October 13 that included Trump, Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as well as leaders or senior officials from more than two dozen other countries, to formally sign the Trump peace plan. In accordance with that plan, all 20 living Israeli hostages were freed. The remains of 13 deceased Israeli hostages (out of 28) have not been returned to date. Egypt, along with Türkiye, has sent search-and-rescue personnel to Gaza to help Hamas and United Nations personnel locate and repatriate those remains.
Sisi and his team recognize that permanent peace and security along the Egypt-Gaza border depend on the full implementation of the Trump plan. A stable, final settlement in Gaza would, among other positive effects for Egypt, prompt Israel to withdraw from the areas of Gaza bordering Egypt, including the frontier city of Rafah. Egyptian officials have chafed at Israel’s occupation of the border areas and objected to Israel’s announcement on October 18 that the Rafah crossing would stay closed “until further notice.” An end to the conflict would also remove the threat that Trump’s team — or Israel — might yet follow through on his earlier suggestions to temporarily resettle much of Gaza’s population in Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab states.
Egyptian officials are working to overcome the key hurdles to completing the Trump plan: securing an agreement on Hamas demobilization and disarmament and the establishment of a governing entity for the territory. The Trump plan provides for an international stabilization force (ISF) to secure the enclave until a Palestinian security force can be adequately trained to deploy to the Strip. Cairo has pledged troops for the ISF, but, like the other potential donors to the unit, it has conditioned participation on Hamas’ agreement to demobilize. To date, Hamas leaders have rejected complete disarmament, arguing the group distrusts Israel’s enduring commitment to the ceasefire and claims its fighters need weaponry to defend against Israel-backed Gaza clans seeking to displace Hamas. Cairo has also looked ahead toward longer-term security arrangements in Gaza, working with Jordan since April to train Palestinian security personnel to deploy to the territory eventually. In August, Egyptian foreign minister Badr Abdelatty confirmed reports that the Egypt-Jordan training program, which initially had only 300 participants, was expanded to include 5,000 police officers who will serve in Gaza after multilateral peacekeepers complete their mission. Most of the participants in the training are members of the Fatah faction of the PLO and the PA, even though Netanyahu has publicly opposed a role for the PA in postwar governance and security of Gaza.
Egyptian leaders also assess that enduring peace and stability in Gaza depends on establishing a capable government that excludes Hamas members — a non-negotiable demand of the Trump team as well as Israel. However, Egypt’s assessment, likely to draw opposition from Israeli and Trump officials, is that it is crucial to solicit Hamas’ input into the formation of that interim body. Last week, Cairo hosted delegations from Hamas and Fatah to discuss postwar arrangements for the Gaza Strip, according to Egypt’s state-run Al-Qahera News. Egypt convened the meetings as part of its wider push to build Palestinian consensus around the Trump plan. Egypt’s intelligence chief Hassan Rashad also solicited the views of senior leaders from other key militant factions, including Iran-backed Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Following the talks, Hamas issued what it said was a joint statement from a group of “Palestinian factions,” announcing that they have agreed to the Trump plan’s provision for an independent committee of Palestinian technocrats to administer postwar Gaza on an interim basis.
Cairo also seeks to prevent a reignition of the June Twelve-Day War between Iran and Israel — a flare-up that could potentially escalate into a broader regional conflagration. An extended U.S. or Israeli conflict with Iran threatens to further damage Egypt’s economy by provoking Iran’s ally, the Houthi movement of Yemen, to escalate its attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. In September, Egypt brokered an agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), paving the way for a restoration of Iran-IAEA cooperation, which Iran suspended following the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear sites in June. In an effort to try to reinstate nuclear negotiations between the Trump team and their Iranian counterparts — talks Iran ended after the U.S. strike on its nuclear sites — Foreign Minister Abdelatty held phone calls on October 18 with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, IAEA Director Rafael Grossi, and U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff. According to an Egyptian foreign ministry readout, the talks emphasized the “importance of continuing confidence-building measures and creating the conditions necessary to resume negotiations between Iran and the United States, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue that addresses the interests of all parties and contributes to regional peace and stability.”
Cairo’s geostrategic concerns also include the conflict-ridden countries on its western and southern borders, Libya and Sudan. In both cases, Sisi, a general who used his army command position to achieve political power, is supporting military strongmen — despite their abysmal human rights records — on the premise that they can restore security and protect Egypt’s interests. In Libya, Cairo has supported eastern Libyan potentate General Khalifah Haftar against a separate UN-backed administration in Tripoli that relies heavily on Islamist militias in western Libya. In Sudan, Sisi backs the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against a challenge from the lighter but nimble Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), which has been supplied by Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Whereas Cairo has more recently sought to help diplomatically reconcile Haftar and the leaders of western Libya, it has been consistently militarily active in the Sudan war. Intelligence from multiple international observers, including Reuters, the Carnegie Middle East Center, and independent satellite data analysts, indicates that Egypt has supplied logistical aid, ammunition, and even limited air support to Burhan’s forces — aid that helped the Sudanese army recapture most of the capital, Khartoum, from RSF units in March. However, more recently, the RSF secured control over the remaining key parts of the Darfur region, suggesting that Egypt’s intervention has not brought the Sudan war to a conclusion.