Cameroon: Unrest erupts over President Biya’s re-election

Election-related unrest broke out in Cameroon last month after the main opposition candidate, Issa Tchiroma Bakary, claimed that he had won the 12 October presidential election before the official announcement by the Constitutional Council.1 Fearing that the ruling party would manipulate the results, many of Bakary’s supporters and other opposition party members gathered in several towns, calling for the election results to reflect the actual vote tabulation. However, the Constitutional Council’s official presidential election announcement on 27 October declared incumbent President Paul Biya the victor. According to the announcement, Biya won 53.6% of the votes over Bakary, who garnered 35.19%.2 The announcement sparked numerous demonstrations. ACLED records at least 48 reported fatalities as a result of live ammunition and beatings, along with widespread arrests of demonstrators by state forces.3 In several major cities, including Douala, Garoua, and Maroua, rioters barricaded roads, burned ruling party buildings, and fought with security forces.

In response to the election results and government crackdown on demonstrators, Bakary called for three days of lockdown measures starting on 3 November. Lockdowns, often called “dead cities,” are a common form of protest in Cameroon and are especially used by the separatist movement in the Anglophone North West and South West regions. These lockdowns have brought public life to a halt, especially in areas of strong opposition support.4 Meanwhile, Paul Nji, minister of territorial administration, has threatened legal action against Bakary for inciting unrest.5

Mali: Violence surges in Segou and Sikasso as FAMa-Dozo operations target a JNIM blockade

In October, violence in Mali’s Segou and Sikasso regions surged to record levels as Malian armed forces (FAMa) and Dozo militias carried out operations in an attempt to combat the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)’s ongoing fuel blockades that restrict fuel deliveries and disrupt movements on main transit routes connecting Bamako, Segou, and Sikasso. Joint FAMa and Dozo operations in the Segou and Niono cercles were marked by mass atrocities, including the killing of at least 28 civilians in Kamona on 2 October and over 30 cattle owners near Markala on 23 October. FAMa relied heavily on air and drone strikes to counter JNIM’s fuel blockade. Despite official claims of militant losses, the blockade remains in effect.

JNIM maintained its fuel embargo by attacking army escorts and burning fuel convoys near Sikasso, Kolondieba, and Loulouni, while clashing with Dozo militias and targeting police and gendarmerie posts in San. JNIM targeted civilians through checkpoint searches, abductions, and intimidation along major transit routes. The group also kidnapped two Egyptian nationals,6 and received a ransom estimated to be between 50-70 million US dollars for the release of two Emirati hostages abducted south of Bamako in September.7 The ransom payment boosts the group’s financial resources, potentially enabling it to sustain or intensify the fuel embargo in central and southern Mali. The increasingly dangerous and unpredictable environment has prompted about a dozen countries, including the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, to advise their citizens to leave Mali.8

Niger: ISSP shifts its operations to population centers and JNIM broadens its reach

In October, militant attacks in population centers and continued operations in peripheral areas in Niger reflected the persistent fragility of the Nigerien state and the expanding influence of militant groups since the July 2023 coup. On 21 October, suspected Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) militants abducted a US citizen working as a missionary from his residence in the capital of Niamey. This incident follows a series of kidnappings of foreigners in the country and reflects the growing trend of ISSP extending its operations into urban areas. A few days earlier, on 18 October, ISSP militants attacked security force positions and administrative sites in Bagaroua, in the Tahoua region. They killed at least two security personnel and looted local government buildings. These events followed coordinated ISSP attacks in September in and around the town of Tillaberi, the capital of the Tillaberi region.

In southwestern Niger, JNIM continued to exert pressure along the Benin border while expanding its ideological outreach. Throughout October, JNIM militants carried out small-scale attacks and planted IEDs in the Tanda commune, Dosso region, killing farmers and burning homes. The group also destroyed telecommunications installations and municipal buildings in Fabidji and Belande. As part of its broader outreach, JNIM released a video addressed to Ahlus Sunnah clerics in Niger, who the narrator described as Wahhabi-oriented marabouts. He called on them to join the group and presented jihad as the only path to real change.9 JNIM also claimed responsibility for its first attack in Nigeria on 28 October, in Nuku, Kwara state, where it killed one soldier and seized weapons and equipment.10 These developments underscore the growing strategic importance of the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands for both JNIM and ISSP.

Somalia: Hours after the removal of checkpoints, al-Shabaab strikes a prison in Mogadishu

On 4 October, approximately seven al-Shabaab militants disguised as security officers attacked the Godka Jilicow prison in Mogadishu. The facility, located near the presidential palace, houses al-Shabaab members and other high-profile detainees and serves as the Banadir headquarters of the National Intelligence and Security Agency. Investigations revealed that the militants had conducted multiple reconnaissance runs using vehicles painted to resemble official security vehicles, which are typically exempt from inspection.11 The assault began with a car bomb detonation, followed by heavy gunfire and multiple explosions. The siege lasted six hours before security forces regained control, killing all seven attackers. Several prisoners escaped during the chaos, though many were later recaptured by local residents.12 An unspecified number of security personnel were killed. The attack occurred shortly after the government lifted several long-standing security checkpoints and reopened over 50 roads, citing improved stability in the capital.13 This is the third such attack on a prison carried out by al-Shabaab in 2025.

While the prison attack represents a propaganda blow for the federal government, it also coincided with notable gains. At the beginning of October, Somali security forces, in collaboration with Ugandan forces serving under the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, regained control of the strategic Awdheegle town in Lower Shabelle — located about 80 kilometers from the capital and situated at the intersection of major supply routes that connect the capital with southern Somalia.

Sudan: The RSF attacks civilians after taking over El Fasher and Bara

On 26 October, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) 6th Infantry Division Headquarters in El Fasher after the SAF and its ally, the Darfur Joint Forces, withdrew overnight on 25 October. The city, which the RSF had besieged since May 2024, was the SAF’s last stronghold in the Darfur region. Civilians trapped during the siege faced violence when attempting to flee, and reports emerged of widespread attacks against civilians following the takeover. Some accounts indicate that an estimated 1,300 people were killed in El Fasher in the first few days of RSF control.14 The World Health Organization and the Sudan Doctors’ Network reported that at least 460 patients were killed in the Saudi maternity hospital at the hands of RSF militants who stormed the building.15 With over 2,000 people reportedly killed across the country from 26 October to 1 November16 this has been Sudan’s deadliest week since the conflict began in April 2023.

In a further blow to the SAF, on 25 October, the RSF recaptured the strategic town of Bara, situated in North Kordofan along a supply route connecting western Sudan to Khartoum. RSF forces reportedly killed up to 300 civilians in Bara, including five Sudanese Red Crescent Society volunteers. Following these incidents, close to 2,000 civilians managed to flee to the capital, El Obeid.17 The SAF had previously re-taken Bara on 11 September. The two actors continue to fight over the control of Bara as both sides vie for key routes linking central Sudan with Darfur and Kordofan. The SAF aims to secure these corridors to enable an advance westward into Darfur, while the RSF seeks to block this expansion and reinforce its dominance in western Sudan. The fall of El Fasher and Bara represents a significant setback for the SAF, strengthening the RSF’s position in Kordofan and potentially enabling it to shift the conflict’s frontlines back toward central Sudan.

The RSF’s violent targeting of civilians after gaining control of a territory is common. As a result, civilians usually flee their homes when it becomes clear that the RSF will take control of an area. After the fall of the al-Jazirah state capital, Wad Madani, to the RSF in December 2023, more than 500,000 people were displaced.18 Ten months later, in November 2024, the RSF attacked civilians in at least 70 villages, mainly targeting the Shukriya, senior RSF commander Abu Aqla Keikel’s ethnic group, after he defected to the SAF. At least 316 civilians were killed, and thousands fled their homes.

Tanzania: Hassan’s election is marked by demonstrations and killings

Following elections on 29 October, Samia Suluhu Hassan was sworn in as president on 3 November. This comes after five days of civil unrest across Mainland Tanzania, to which security forces responded with lethal force. The unrest reflects growing resistance to the increasingly repressive approach Hassan has taken toward opponents, particularly in Mainland Tanzania, since she assumed power in March 2021.

On the day of the election, violent demonstrations broke out in 10 regions across the country.19 For the final three days of October, ACLED records an unprecedented 70 disorder events in Mainland Tanzania. Unusually, there was no trouble in Hassan’s home of Zanzibar, where Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) also won the election. Demonstrators targeted polling stations, police stations, as well as government and CCM offices and vehicles. Full details of the extent of the disorder have yet to emerge, as the government shut down the internet by midday on 29 October. It remained shut down until 3 November.20 Media outlets in the country also suspended publication, while a dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed from 29 October to 3 November.21

Opposition activists have estimated that between 400 and 700 people had been killed in the unrest by 31 October, a toll that had risen to 2,000 by 2 November.22 Images and reports on social media suggest that security forces killed at least dozens — possibly hundreds — of people.23 Emerging evidence indicates that security forces were indiscriminate, firing freely at unarmed people.24 Currently, accurate fatality figures are not available, in part due to the internet shutdown, but also because authorities have placed strict controls on the return of bodies and the conduct of funerals in Dar es Salaam.25 Similar reports have emerged from the Mbeya region. Combined with claims by police that the trouble was caused by foreigners, these controls have raised concerns of the possibility of authorities disposing of corpses.26 Activists already allege that bodies are being buried in mass graves.27

The killings by state forces will significantly undermine the legitimacy of both Hassan and CCM, which has ruled since independence. They will also likely strengthen support for Mainland Tanzania to have constitutional autonomy similar to Zanzibar. Their legitimacy will be further undermined as reports from observers emerge. A preliminary report from the Southern African Development Community records ballot stuffing, intimidation of observers, and police firing on demonstrators. It concludes that “in most areas, voters could not express their democratic will.”28