The Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP) has escalated its campaign of targeted sectarian violence in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, killing at least 43 Catholic civilians in Komanda over the weekend.

ISCAP’s renewed tempo follows increased pressure on its key strongholds—particularly its “Madina” camp—under joint Congolese-Ugandan operations, prompting retaliatory mass-casualty attacks in civilian areas.

The March 23 Movement’s (M23) parallel expansion has weakened counterinsurgency responses, allowing the jihadists to exploit and intensify attacks in areas where a security presence remains thin.

The resurgence of ISCAP underscores the threat posed by Islamic State affiliates in Africa, where deteriorating governance, foreign troop drawdowns, and competing armed actors have contributed to jihadist expansion.

Over the weekend, at least 43 people were killed in an attack by the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), in Komanda city, located in Irumu territory in southern Ituri province of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The region borders North Kivu, parts of which remain under partial militant control. ISCAP claimed responsibility for the assault, further stating that it burned dozens of homes and shops, and destroyed six vehicles and four motorcycles. Among the victims were 20 civilians who were stabbed to death during a prayer vigil at a Catholic church, where the group reportedly opened fire and attacked with machetes during morning mass.

There has been a marked resurgence in ADF violence against primarily Christian congregations in vulnerable rural communities in the month of July 2025. The Ituri and North Kivu provinces have faced a wave of violent attacks by ADF militants, with at least 82 fatalities according to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). These ADF attacks are likely in response to Congolese and Ugandan forces forcing the group out of its strongholds in the Lolwa forest along the Komanda-Mambasa corridor earlier that month.

Since the most recent attack, over half of Komanda’s population has fled—worsening the severe displacement levels that eastern DRC is already experiencing due to non-state actor–related violence. The Rwanda-backed March 23 Movement (M23) insurgency has resurged since December 2024, consolidating its control over much of eastern DRC’s North and South Kivu. M23 and ADF are now operating in increasingly geographically proximate areas, which is undermining the capacity of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and its coalition forces to counter the surging threat from either group. Moreover, M23’s rapid territorial gains have precipitated the arrival and redeployment of a range of regional forces and local militias. The resulting disarray has compromised cohesive military coordination, ultimately providing the ADF with opportunities to exploit—the group has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to rapidly adapt to fluid frontlines and take advantage of emerging power vacuums.

The recent attack appears to be a reprisal for intensified military pressure by the joint Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF)–FARDC offensive, known as “Operation Shujaa,” on ISCAP’s largest camp—referred to as “Madina”—located in the remote forested areas of Ituri’s Mambasa territory. The camp, believed to house between 1,000 and 1,500 fighters and their families and serves as the base of ADF commander Musa Baluku, has come under sustained assault, forcing the group to disperse and relocate.

In early June 2025, the ADF—which originated as a Uganda-based rebel group—attempted a suicide bombing targeting Christians, in Uganda’s capital city Kampala, on Uganda’s Martyrs Day. This was the first attempted suicide attack within Uganda’s borders since 2023 and may have been a bid to project strength in response to the sustained military pressure. It also signals that the group retains cross-border networks and the capacity to operate beyond eastern DRC, in line with its broader transnational jihadist ambitions. Though not consistently active outside its core area of operations, the ADF remains linked to Islamic State (IS) networks spanning from the Horn of Africa to South Africa and maintains both the intent and latent capability to carry out mass violence, and urban attacks across the wider region.

Operation Shujaa—a bilateral security agreement between the Congolese and Ugandan military—launched in November 2021 to secure North and South Kivu and the Ugandan/DRC border against the burgeoning ADF threat, has had mixed successes. While it has forced the ADF out of some of its entrenched strongholds, the group has proved resilient, splintering into mobile units that remain active across the dense forest terrain of eastern DRC. These units have been able to avoid direct confrontations with the joint Congolese and Ugandan operations by moving into remote regions.

The ADF has continued to carry out deadly attacks on civilians in areas where Operation Shujaa has had limited reach, as the operation’s efforts have been somewhat concentrated in the Uganda-DRC border regions, where the ADF maintains a stronghold and many of its camps are located. While prioritizing border security is logical from both Kampala’s and Kinshasa’s perspectives, it has also pushed the group further into eastern DRC’s interior. This may serve a dual purpose for Kampala: countering the threat of cross-border ADF raids while simultaneously creating the impetus for a deeper UPDF presence in eastern DRC. This effectively allows Uganda to carve out its own sphere of influence—alongside the M23-Rwanda coalition—in this mineral-rich region. As such, a consequence of the joint operation—potentially skewed by Uganda’s national priorities—has been increased civilian vulnerability in areas beyond its immediate focus. ACLED data shows that civilian fatalities rose by 68% in the first part of 2025—marking the ADF’s second-deadliest quarter for civilian targeting since 1997.

The ADF is one of the Islamic State’s most violent affiliates towards civilians. This is, in part, due to the lack of a major Muslim presence in the region, which limits the group’s ability to govern and has instead led it to focus on a strategy of destroying towns in its areas of operation through mass killings and other forms of violence. However, there appears to have been a shift since April of this year, with the group increasingly leveraging forced taxes on local populations and indicating more sustained forms of interaction with local communities. This may be linked to the uptick in pressure on IS-Somalia—the financial and logistical hub for ISCAP—under U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts, which could be forcing the group to seek alternative revenue streams.

Sectarianism has long been part of the Islamic State’s strategy on a global scale. IS uses sectarianism in its propaganda to recruit new members, radicalize would-be supporters, and raise funds from its followers. According to BBC Monitoring, nearly 90 percent of Islamic State operations are now carried out by affiliates in Africa, cementing the continent as the epicenter of jihadist terrorism worldwide. Given that IS affiliates operate in failed states plagued by poor governance, inept security forces, and weak rule of law, most analysts expect that the ongoing surge in terrorism will continue for the foreseeable future. Both the United States and France have drastically drawn down their presence, respectively. The security vacuum has been filled, in some cases, initially by Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group, many of whom are now reflagged under the banner of Africa Corps. Where Africa Corps operates, draconian counterinsurgency tactics serve to exacerbate terrorist violence, not ameliorate it.