Bottom Line Up Front

For the fourth year in a row, the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa—a semi-arid region stretching from the Sahel desert in North Africa to the more humid savannas of the south—has been the most lethal theater in terms of deaths stemming from terrorism.

Just last weekend, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) announced that it had killed more than 70 soldiers in raids conducted on two military posts in northern Benin, which would be the most significant attack in terms of lethality in that country in more than a decade.

If Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) links up with Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), it will help both groups operationally, extending the jihadists’ reach from the Sahel to the Lake Chad Basin.

In the Horn of Africa, both the Islamic State- Somalia Province (IS-Somalia) and al-Qaeda’s Somali branch, al-Shabaab, continue to destabilize the region and remain important cogs in the broader global jihadist universe.

For the fourth year in a row, the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa—a semi-arid region stretching from the Sahel desert in North Africa to the more humid savannas of the south—has been the most lethal theater in terms of deaths stemming from terrorism. According to data collected and analyzed by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), six of the top ten countries affected by terrorism (measured by incidents, fatalities, injuries, and hostages) are in sub-Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso (1), Mali (4), Niger (5), Nigeria (6), Somalia (7), and Cameroon (10). When the data is extended to the top 25 countries, others that make the list include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (12), Mozambique (17), Kenya (19), Chad (23), and Togo (24).

The al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which was rebranded from Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) in early 2022, remain among the most active terrorism threats in the region. JNIM has expanded its recruitment activities and control of territory, pushing eastward from Burkina Faso toward Niger, and southward toward Benin, Ghana, and Togo. Just last weekend, JNIM contingent Katiba Hanifa, announced that it had killed more than 70 soldiers in raids conducted on two military posts in northern Benin, which would be the most significant attack in terms of lethality in that country in more than a decade. With U.S. and French forces drawn down considerably in the region, and the presence of Russian mercenaries from the Africa Corps (formerly known as the Wagner Group), there are growing concerns that jihadist groups will continue expanding toward the Gulf of Guinea and coastal West Africa.

Elsewhere on the continent, a range of other terrorist groups pose significant challenges to states and their security forces. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) remains steadfast in the face of mounting counterterrorism pressure from Nigerian forces and occasional skirmishes with Boko Haram. If ISWAP links up with ISSP, it will help both groups operationally, extending the jihadists’ reach from the Sahel to the Lake Chad Basin. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, northeastern Nigeria remains the focal point of jihadist terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin, accounting for two-thirds of all fatalities in the theater. Over the past year, there has also been a 51 percent increase in violent deaths in Cameroon, contributing to the country making the top 10 of countries most affected by terrorism globally, as aforementioned.

In the Horn of Africa, both the Islamic State- Somalia Province (IS-Somalia) and al-Qaeda’s Somali branch, al-Shabaab, continue to destabilize the region and remain important cogs in the broader global jihadist universe. According to the Global Terrorism Threat Assessment report for 2025, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “al-Shabaab is the African terrorist group most likely to conduct a deadly terrorist attack against a U.S. target.” Moreover, IS-Somalia remains a critically important logistical node within the Islamic State’s global network of affiliates, attracting foreign fighters from the Middle East and Africa, while also handling decisions related to personnel, finances, and other important facilitative functions. Its leader, Abdul Qadir Mumin, is also the head of the Al-Karrar office, and operates from a stronghold in Buur Dhexaad in the mountainous area of the Puntland, in northeastern Somalia. The United States has been active conducting drone strikes against terrorist targets in Somalia during President Trump’s first several months in office, a trend likely to continue throughout this year, in an effort to degrade the infrastructure of jihadist groups including al-Shabaab and IS-Somalia.

In central and southern Africa, groups like the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (also known as the Islamic State in the DRC) and the Islamic State Mozambique or Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (ASWJ) continue to ebb and flow in strength and seek out opportunities to go on the offensive, with both groups leveraging security vacuums emerging from acute domestic political crises to advance and regroup. In Mozambique, ASWJ has benefited from a range of regional support networks to advance its ongoing insurgency in the northern – and most economically underdeveloped – region of Cabo Delgado. IS Somalia Province has been a key player in providing operational and financial support for ASWJ’s efforts to systematically dismantle the Mozambican state via attacks on critical infrastructure and the country’s emerging LNG industry, including the 2021 assault on a $20 billion LNG (liquified natural gas) project from TotalEnergies, forcing its suspension. While foreign military interventions – most notably by the Rwandan Defense Forces and the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), both partly incentivized by efforts to consolidate their sphere of influence in the resource-rich country – have depleted the insurgency, abuses by these forces risk driving up recruitment. Meanwhile, ASWJ remains active through smaller, mobile splinter factions that are expanding beyond traditional strongholds. Their campaign of violence primarily targets civilians, at a more pronounced rate in comparison to other jihadist groups operating in Africa. Ongoing violent unrest following the disputed 2024 presidential election may offer the insurgency a strategic window for expansion, as it capitalizes on both the security void and heightened anti-government sentiment – factors that ultimately facilitates its jihadi state-building endeavors.

DRC meanwhile, saw a spike in violence early in 2025 following the resurgence of the Rwandan-backed March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group. Within a matter of months, M23 has consolidated control of the majority of North and South Kivu in east DRC. Concurrently, the region is grappling with the increased activities of ISCAP, known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces. The group has evolved from a local Ugandan Islamist insurgency into one of the Islamic State’s most active affiliates, causing over one thousand fatalities in 2023 alone. Despite some gains from joint military operations between Uganda and the DRC to contain the threat along their shared border, the redeployment of Congolese forces to counter the M23 threat has worsened the already fragile security landscape. The ADF has capitalized on this gap to launch a new wave of high-casualty attacks and reclaim territory. Moreover, Uganda’s sustained military engagement may be driven not only by counterterrorism objectives but also by strategic interests in securing access to eastern DRC’s resource-rich territories – paralleling Rwanda’s geostrategic motivations in its support of the M23 insurgency. Given that the eastern part of the country is home to more than 100 non-state armed groups, as well as external actors sponsoring various proxy forces, there is no end in sight to terrorist and insurgent violence in the foreseeable future.