In the aftermath of decolonization, Europe’s engagement with Africa was largely shaped by a developmental ethos rooted in normative ideals—shared values, democracy promotion, and human rights. For decades, European policy focused on capacity-building and humanitarian aid while avoiding direct political or military entanglements. These efforts included funding for rural electrification, water and sanitation projects, support for civil society, and institutional reform.
However, rising geopolitical tensions, shifting migration patterns, increasing resource dependencies, and the diminishing influence of former colonial powers have prompted a strategic reorientation. This article examines the evolution of European policy in Africa, arguing that its current trajectory reflects a recalibrated realism—blending normative commitments with a more transactional approach aimed at safeguarding its interests in a multipolar world.
Altruistic Aid or Strategic Assistance?
Europe’s policies in Africa are driven by a mix of post-colonial guilt and normative ambition. Development aid, governance initiatives, and multilateral partnerships are framed in the language of equality and human rights, promoting gender equity, rural development, and education. Yet behind this altruistic façade lie pragmatic objectives: stemming mass migration, cultivating stable trade partners, and buffering against regional instability that could spill into Europe’s immediate neighborhood.
Military involvement follows a similar pattern of restraint. Unlike the United States’ assertive presence—characterized by drone operations, counterterrorism missions, and lethal aid—Europe favors limited training programs and non-lethal assistance, such as the EU Training Missions in Somalia and the Central African Republic(CAR). These programs emphasize multilateralism and local empowerment. Although development-oriented in form, such initiatives are ultimately intended to foster stable political environments that align with European interests.
The Collapse of the Soft Power Consensus
Recent global shifts have undermined the foundations of Europe’s normative engagement. The dismantling of USAID and Washington’s broader retreat from development assistance created a power vacuum, particularly in countries like Ethiopia and South Sudan, which had long depended on US support. While this presents Europe with a chance to expand its role, it also marks a wider shift toward transactionalism, as embodied in China’sinfrastructure-for-resources agreements and Russia’s provision of security in exchange for mining rights.
Europe finds itself ill-equipped to compete in this environment. The 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act, which mandates greater self-sufficiency in sourcing critical minerals like lithium and cobalt, compels Brussels to seek extraction partnerships in Africa. Yet many of the most advantageous resource deals have already been sealed by competitors offering fewer conditions and quicker returns. Countries such as China, Turkey, and the UAE gain access through flexible financing, support for non-democratic regimes, and turnkey infrastructure projects. In contrast, Europe’s proposals often remain entangled in regulatory compliance, lengthy approval processes, and transparency requirements.
Migration and the Imperative of Containment
Migration management has become a cornerstone of EU-Africa relations. In the wake of the 2015 migration crisis, which saw over one million refugees and migrants enter Europe, European governments outsourced border enforcement to North African states, notably Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. In exchange for financial and technical support, these governments are tasked with intercepting migrants, operating detention centers, and controlling departures to Europe.
While these arrangements have successfully reduced arrivals—such as the decrease in sea crossings from Libya between 2016 and 2019—they have also drawn criticism for empowering authoritarian regimes and enabling human rights abuses. EU funding indirectly supports militias and coast guards accused of violence, extortion, and forced labor.
With public and political support for development-focused migration policies declining, the EU increasingly conditions aid and trade agreements on cooperation in migration deterrence. The 2023 deal with Tunisia, which included €105 million for border management, exemplifies this securitized model. Immediate border stability has taken precedence over long-term development or the creation of legal migration pathways.
Security Engagement and Strategic Constraints
Historically, European security engagement in Africa emphasized institutional reform and capacity-building through missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Yet developments in key regions—such as the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—have exposed the fragility and limitations of this approach.
Despite the allocation of substantial resources to governance reforms in Africa—including €29 billion for sub-Saharan Africa under the 2021–2027 NDICI/Global Europe Instrument—such reforms have often proven to be short-lived. In Mali, for instance, European-backed efforts were reversed following two coups in 2020 and 2021, leading to the expulsion of French and EU forces and their replacement by Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group.
Unlike US and Russian approaches—based on direct military presence or mercenary deployments—the EU has opted for a risk-averse model based on multilateral partnerships and technical support. This calculated restraint reflects political caution and institutional constraints, but it limits Europe’s ability to shape outcomes in contested security environments. In regions where assertive actors offer more direct support, the EU often appears indecisive or peripheral.
Economic Competition and Critical Minerals
Africa’s wealth of critical minerals has made it a focal point in global supply chain strategies. As Europe accelerates its green and digital transitions, its reliance on imported materials such as cobalt from the DRC, lithium from Zimbabwe, and rare earths from Southern Africa has become a strategic concern. Over 60% of the EU’s cobalt supply currently originates from Africa, often refined in China.
Initiatives like the Lobito Corridor—linking Angola, Zambia, and the DRC to the Atlantic coast—and the Clean Trade and Investment Partnership with South Africa aim to secure resources while promoting local value addition. However, many African governments increasingly reject models focused solely on raw material extraction. They demand technology transfer, skills training, and domestic processing facilities, seeking to avoid a repeat of the colonial “mine-to-port” dynamic.
While the EU emphasizes ESG compliance and sustainability, its financial packages often pale in comparison to Chinese offers, which include railway networks, industrial parks, and large-scale energy projects. To compete effectively, Europe must scale its offerings and tailor them to align with African aspirations for industrialization and economic sovereignty.
The Erosion of French Influence
France’s waning influence in Africa—evidenced by military withdrawals from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—has forced a recalibration of the EU’s Africa strategy. Once seen as the de facto lead in EU-African relations, France now faces popular resistance and accusations of neocolonialism, particularly in the Sahel. The CFA franc’s controversial legacy, combined with Operation Barkhane’s perceived failures, has fueled regional discontent.
As Paris retreats, Brussels is experimenting with decentralized models of engagement. Initiatives like the Global Gateway—a €150 billion investment package—aim to shift the focus toward sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, and green energy partnerships. However, internal divisions among EU member states, each pursuing their own bilateral interests, continue to weaken the cohesion of these efforts. Some states may prioritize partnerships that secure critical minerals or energy resources, even if they fall short of aligning with the Global Gateway’s sustainability criteria.
The Limits of Conditionality
For decades, conditionality has defined Europe’s relationship with Africa, linking aid and trade to reforms in governance, labor rights, and environmental standards. Yet African states, increasingly confident and assertive in a multipolar global order, are challenging this model. The appeal of BRICS, Gulf states, and China lies in their willingness to offer investment without governance strings.
Examples abound: Angola’s oil-for-infrastructure deals with China, Egypt’s financing from the Gulf, and Mali’s pivot to Russian security support all illustrate the diminishing appeal of Europe’s conditional aid. As a result, Brussels has adopted a posture of “principled pragmatism,” relaxing its requirements in certain contexts to maintain access and influence.
However, this hybrid model risks eroding the EU’s soft power advantage. African leaders have increasingly voiced concerns about European double standards—particularly when normative rhetoric is applied inconsistently, such as favoring specific political candidates instead of promoting comprehensive institutional reforms. Maintaining credibility while adapting to new geopolitical realities will require a careful recalibration of Europe’s strategy.
Navigating Realism and Relevance
Europe’s approach to Africa is undergoing a profound transformation. Confronted with declining influence, intensifying competition, and internal fragmentation, the EU is shifting from a predominantly normative framework toward a more interest-driven strategy. While the language of partnership and shared values remains, it increasingly serves the function of strategic stabilization rather than idealistic engagement.
This realist turn does not signal the abandonment of development goals, but rather their instrumentalization in the service of European economic, security, and migration priorities. The future of EU-Africa relations will depend on Europe’s capacity to align its strategic objectives with Africa’s growing demand for reciprocity, sovereignty, and industrial autonomy. Without such alignment, Europe risks diminishing its relevance in a multipolar world where transactional partnerships offer faster and more flexible alternatives.